Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

State of Utah v. Joseph Dean Peterson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
McCullough, Wilkinson & Boyce; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Peterson, No. 7286 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1043

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

J
·• i~e SupreJDe Court
ot

the State of \Jtah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
7286

vs.
JOSEPH DEAN PETERSON,
Defendant an.d Appellant,

ll?IL E

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE ·---ClERK~-SUPREMECOURT~
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUN'TY,
STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE WILLIAM STANLEY DUNFORD
McCULLOUGH. WILKINSON & BOYCE
Attorneys for Defendant '(J!I'I)d Appe:llant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
1

• • • • • • •
• • • • • • • •
• • • • • • • • • • • • •

J~)
ld~
1"

PROPOSITI0!1 I

The ool.ll't erred ln adat1 t ttna

teatlnonr ot tbe I'Wooatton ot
the drtver' a license · or tl» ·

48

defendant • • • • • • • • • • •
~OPOSTT!Olf

II

Tho oourt erred in admlt"tf.'n;
evtdenoe on the iaauo as to
whether the detendant was tmdeP
the tntluenoe of 1ntox1cat1ng
11'".'"·I' at the t.1me ot tho

all;p. arl• • • • . • . • • . 64

?itOPOSI'l'IO!i III
The oo\ll'tt Ol'red :tn ove'l'l'\ll11lg

defendant.'• motion t·o dlerdes

the
the
the
and

lntOI'ml.tlo.ft and dlaoharge

detendant at the· 9 lqsi:ot

State's oaae (T. 470. · )
1n retustng to pant · eten<lant 'a request-a 1nstt"'.:~ot1 on
no. 1 C1. 22, 'r. 720) to dtl'Ject
the Jur:r to return a ver-di c. t ·ot
not gu11t7

69

•• • •• • • • • •

PROPOS!!JION IV

The court lti'Nd in rall1n; to
1Mtruot the j'Uf'J' a• to the
.elonenta or tnvol\ll).tarr ttanalaughtelt and the law pertain..
1n1 thereto, but on tbe contrtU-)"
o~neou.sl7 1natNcted the . J\l'r7
on those tun4amental pr1nc1pleo. 70
4

~

•

...

•

"'

...

~

••

...

•

...

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCt.TT1 rON' • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12

INDEX
Page
STATEMENT OF FACT····················~~~~---··········-·······-----·-····-······-··--------STATEMENT OF ERRORS ·········-····--·····------···--·-····-·······-·---·--~---·····------ARGUMENT ----·--------·--·--···········---··------·--·--------··-·········--······················----·-PROPOSITION I ··--·--······················--··-····--···-·-··············---------------------PROPOSITION II ----·-···--------·-··-------····--·····--····--··········--·-··········--------PROPOSITION III ..............................................................................
PROPOSITION IV ..............................................................................
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................

1
43
48
48
64
69
70
72

Authorities
CASES:
State of Utah v. Lingman, 97 Utah 197 to 201 ................................ 50, 55
People v. Black, (1931, 11 Cal. App. 90, 295 P. 87 ................................ 56
State v. Long, (1919), (Delaware), 7 Boyce 397, 108 A. 36 ................ 56
State v. Mcivor, (1920), 31 Del. 123, 111 A. 616 .................................. 56
ThompSon v. State, (1933), 108 Fla. 370, 146 So. 201 ....................56, 57
State v. Gee, (1930), 48 Idaho 688, 284 P. 845 ...................................... 56
Dunnville v. State, (1919), 188 Ind. 373, 123 N.E. 689 ---····-·····------~56, 57
Blackburn v. State, 1932), 203 Ind. 332, 180 N.E. 180 .................... 56, 58
People v. Barnes, (1914), 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400 .................. 56, 58
State v. Satterfield, (1930), 198 N. C. 682, 153 S.E. 155 ............... .J56, 59
State v. Schaeffer, (1917), 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, LRA
1918B, 945, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1137 ............................................... J36, 60
Jackson v. State, (1920), 101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E.. 870 ................57, 59
Keller v. State, (1927), 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, ,59 A.L.R. 685 .. 57
Hiller v. State, (1932), 164 Tenn. 388, 50 S.W. (2d) 225 ---------------~.57, 61
Norman v. State, (1932), 121 Tex. Crim. Rep. 433, 52 S.W.
(2d) 1051 ------------···--------------·····----------------------··············--····-----······---57, 68
Goodman v. Com., (1930), 153 Va. 943, 151 S.E. 168 ...................... 57, 69
Rex v. Wilmot, (1930), 64 Ont. L. Rep. 605, 52 Can. Grim.
Cas. 336 (1930) 1 D.L.R. 778 ............................................................ 57
TEXT:
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Vol 8,
p. 102 ...................................................................................................... 69

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In the SupreDie Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
7286

vs.
JOSEPH DEAN PETERSON,
DefenOO!nt a-nd Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
S'TATEMENT OF FACT
The errors assigned in this case justify a detailed
epitome of the testimony given by the only two witnesses who made any observation of the mo~ement of
the truck which was involved in the dea!th of the deceased, James Curwood. 'These two witnesses are Bert
Karen and Lawrence Karen, his brother. The deceased
had been riding in the Karen pickup truck just prior to
an accident on U. S. Highway 40 about a mile and half
east of the tittle town of Jensen, Utah, and about :ten
miles east of Vernal. The undisputed evidence shows
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Lawrence Karen and the deceased were drunk at the
time of the accident and, therefore, the testimo:Qy of
Lawrence Karen is of little value in the cas·e. His
testimony, however, will be carefully noted in this Statement of Fact.
On the afternoon of Saturday, September 6, 1947,
Lawrence Karen and the deceased, James Curwood,
were in the Collier Beer Par'lor drinking beer. They had
been there practically all afternoon. ( T. 15, 32). On
Saturday evening, September 6, 1947, Bert Karen met
his brother and Curwood at the beer parlor and they
all had some more beers there. ('T. 32). 'The three of
them then decided to go over to Artesia, Colorado, for
a social trip. Artesia is a l~ttle border town in Colorado
where hard liquors are sold by the drink. They bought
a half dozen 1bott'les of beer to drink on the way ov,er to
Artesia. They got over to Artesia between 8 :00 and
9:00P.M. ('T. 33). They went to a liquor tavern known
as "The Well". They stayed in this place un til a quarter of 2:00 Sunday morning. (T. 34-5). They spent
their time drinking wiskey and beer. Bert Karen testified that he didn't keep traek of how much beer he
drank, but he knew he had had at least one drink ·of
wiskey and four bottles of beer. (T. 62-3). Ber1t Karen
testified that the deceased, James Curwood, and his
brother, Lawrence Karen, had an argument with the
patrons of the tavern which caused considerable disturbance and the Colorado officers were about to 'throw
the two of them in jail for drunkenness when Bert Karen
interceded for them, stating that he would take them
1
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hoine in his truck. ( T. 17, 36). There is no question
at that time the deceased and Lawrence Karen were
thoroughly intoxicated. They left Artesia about a quarter' of 2:00, although neither witness could fix the time
except by the fact that Sammy Hatch, a highway patrolman, to1d them the accident occured around 3:00 o'clock
in the morning. (T. 38). As they travelled toward
Vernal, Utah, Bert Karen stopped the ~truck on Highway 40 about a mile or mile and half east of the Jensen
Bridge and about 300 yards east of the Escalante Monument for the purpose of urinating. ·The following testimony is pertinent :

"Q.

A.
Q.

And as a matter of fact, you heard the officer say your brother and this man Curwood
wer·e drunk, didn't you~
Well, they felt pretty doggone good.
By that you mean they were drunk, weren't
they~

nt

ri~

A.

Well, I am not sure, I guess that is what you
wouid call it, I don't know.

Q.

Isn't that what you told us in the preliminary
hearing, that the both of them were drunk,
not only there but when you got out to the
place where you got out ·to urinate, that they
were drunk then; didn't you testify to that
at the preliminary hearing~

A.

That's right.

Q.

And I ask you this: 'You knew those two
fellows, your brother and the other man, were
drunk, didn't you, at the time you stopped to
get out to urinate~' And your answer was:
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'Yes'. That was your testimony, wasn't it~
A.

That's right.
Q. And when you got up to the Au Miller store
your brother was so drunk he sat out there by
ithe pumps and was so sick he didn't go back
even to the scene of the accident, wasn't he? ·
A. Well, I didn't ask him to go back.

Q.

I know, but as a matter of fact he was so
sick and drunk he didn't even go back~

A.

Well, I don't know whether he was sick or
not.

Q.

Well he was drunk anyway, wasn't he~

A.

He was ful'l.'' (T. 36-37).

At the place where they stopped, Highway 40 was
a hard surfaced road approximately itwenty feet wide,
split down the middle with a yellow line, making two
t·en-foot lanes for east and west travel. On the right
hand side of the road as you travel toward Vernal, or
what is known as the south side of the highway, there
was a two-foot shoulder and immediately to the south
a rather percipitous or steep bank which s'loped into
a borrow pit; that Bert Karen parked his truck on a
bias pointing in a southeasterly direction; that the front
wheels of his truck were on the right ·shoulder but a
substantial portion of the truck remained on the south
traffic lane; that the truck was approximately eighteen
or twenty feet long; that he could not run the, car down
into the borrow pit and, therefore, a substantial part
of the truck was out on the hard surfaced area on the
right side. The following testimony is important:
1
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"Q. Anyway, it is how far east of the Esca'lante
:Monument, we will call that~
A.

Well, I could say about three hundred yards.

Q. Three hundred

yards~

A.

I am just guessing at it. though.

Q.

Some distance east f

A.

Yes.

Q. And it is down in the bottom of a swale there,
isn ':t it?
A.

That's right.

Q. And over on the right hand side, that. is the
right hand side as you go into Vernal, is a
rather steep borrow pit, isn't there~
A.

Yes, it is kind of sloped off.

Q. But the bank is rather precipitous or steep,
isn't it~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the shoulder of the hard surfaced area
is about two feet wide, isn't it~

A.

Well I would be guessing if I said yes on that.

Q.

Is that what you testified to in the preliminary hearing~

A.

It is about like that.

Q.

What is your best judgment~

A.

Well I would say two feet.

Q.

Then it goes abruptly down int0 a borrow
pit, which of course you couldn't run your
car into the borrow pit, could you~
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A. No, sir.
Q. So that you had approximately two feet of
shoulder on the righthand side of your ear
onto which you stopped your car as you have
indicated.
Yes, sir.
Q. And your car was. a Ford pickup truck, wasn't
it'
A. That's right.

A.

Q.

And approximrutely somewheres in the neighborhood of eighteen or twenty feet long?

A.

That is about right.

Q.

This hard surfaced ar,ea is a two lane highway, isn't it'

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

It is split down the

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And both the two sides are about somewheres
in the neiglrborhood of ten feet wide, are
they not, ten foot lanes, about and a twenty
foot highway going up there?

A.

I never measured it, hut that is about right.

Q.

So ~that your car when you parked onto this
two foot shoulder, a substantial part of your
car was out on the hard surfaced area on the
righthand side, wasn't it'

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

So that when you got out you got out of the
car on the left hand side where the hard sur-

midd~e

with a yellow

line~
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faced area was, and you walked around to
the front of the car, didn't you~
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Where the other fellows got out, yon don't
know, do you~

A.

No sir, I didn't pay no attention to them.

Q. Didn't pay any attention. Yon knew at that
time they were both drunk, didn't you.
A.

Yes.

Q.

And whether they got out on the lefthand side
or got out on the righthand side, you didn't
see them get out, did you.

A.

No, didn't pay any attention.

Q. And you didn't s·ee Mr. Curwood, the man
that was killed, or assuming he was killed,
you didn't see him at all until you saw his
body flying on the pavement over about fourteen inches to ~the right of the lefthand ·edge
of the road, did you~
A.

No, sir." (T. 40-1-2).

Bert Karen got out of the truck, went around the
lefthand side to the front of the car to urinate. He
glanced back over his shoulder and saw the flights of a
car coming from the east and traveling toward Vernal.
He watched the lights come down a rather long grade
to the bottom of the swale, where the Karen truck was
parked as aforesaid. 'The following testimony is extremely important and we quote from the record:
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When you got out of the car you walked out
to the front of the car~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And where the other two gentlemen went to
1that were with you, you don't lmowT

'' Q.

A.

No, sir.

Q. Whether they got out on the righthand side
as you come toward Vernal, righthand side
of your car, you don't lmow~
A.

I never paid no attention to them.

Q.

And you got in the front of the car you happened ~to look over our shoulder, kind of
glanced back over your shoulder, didn't you~

A.

That is about right.

Q.

And you saw the lights· of a car coming from
the east, we will call the general direction
east, coming from Artesia, the same direction
you were going, coming down a rather long
grade that comes down to ~the bottom of that
swa1e~

A.

Y~es,

Q.

And there was nothing about the movement
of those lights that attracted yol)r attention,
was there~

A.

No, there wasn't that I noticed.

Q.

And when the lights approached your car, the
car with the lights, turned over to the lefthand side~

sir.

A. 'Thwt's right.
Q. Of the road, to go around you so that there
would be no collision with your car!
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A.

It sure did.

Q.

And that was the normal thing for the car
to do, wasn't it?

A.

That's right.

Q. Because if he had kept coming down lthe
righthand side of the road he would have
hit right in the back of your car, wouldn't he~
A.

That's right.

Q.

So that the lights turned over, and assuming
the lights were attached to the car, turned
over to the righthand side of the road~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

To the lefthand side as we come toward V ernal, your lefthand side~

A.

Yes.

Q.

Then as the car passed you heard a bump?

A.

That's right.

Q.

And that is the only thing that attracted your
aHention to the movement of that particular
car that was out of the ordinary, wasn't it~
Yes, it was; it startled me a little there.

A.

Now after the car passed on up the road, you
saw some clearance lights~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you presumed by the fact that it had
clearance lights that it was a truck~
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after it had gone up the road, you looked
up the road and saw Curwood lying on the
pavement, didn't you~
Q.
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A.

That's right.

Q.

And that is the first time that you saw
Karen-

A.
Q.

I didn'tNot Karen, hut Curwood, I mean Jimmy Curwood, lying on the pavement. And that is the
first time you saw him after you had stopped
your car and got out of the truck and went
to the front~

A.

That's right.

Q.

How he got in that position you don't know,
do you~

A.

I don't know.

Q.

Now you ran up the road to where the body
was, didn't you.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And where was the body with reference to
the lefthand side, lefthand side of the hard
surfaced area, that is, your lefthand side as
you traveled toward Vernal~

A.

He was, oh, about a foot and a half to the
edge of the pavement, just like that is the
edge of the pavement here (indicating).

Q.

You mean a foot and a half toward the center~

A.

On the lefthand side.

Q.

That wouid 'be a foot and a half from ~the
lefthand edge of the hard surfaced ar,ea as
you move toward the center of the streetT

A.

Yes, sir.
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Q.

About in that position when you saw him?

A.

That's right.

Q. And was he lying on his belly, as you stated
a m.inute ago, or on his stomach?
A.
Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.
Q.

That's right.
Then you told us about putting your hand on
him, and so on. You were there for some
appreciable time before your brother came
up, weren't you?
Well I don't know whether it was just-I
imagine maybe split seconds or something
like that.
You don't know, don't have any independent
memory how long it was before your brother
came up?
I wouliln 't say becaus·e I don't know.
And can you give the jury any idea how this
man Curwood got over on the opposite side
of the road from where your car was par'ked?
You don't know, I suppose?
Well I don't know how he got over there.
And the fact that both he and your brother
were drunk never entered into your head
about watching their movements after you got
out of the car?
No, I didn't.
Now when these lights came down the highway that were on the truck or whatever it
was that passed and you heard a thump, there
wasn't any movement of those lights, or the
car upon which the lights were situated, that
attracted your attention as far as being out
of the ordinary movement, was there?
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A.

No, not that I cou'ld say.

Q.

When the car passed you and continued on up
the street, isn't it a fact that the car was going about the same rate of speed as the ordinary car goes on that highway~

A.

That is about right.

Q.

It wasn't going fast and it wasn't going slow,
was it~

A.

No. it was just-

Q.

Going about medium~

A.

About an ordinary speed.

Q.

Going about medium, is what you testified
to at the preliminary-hearing.

A. 'That's right.
Q.

So that the speed of the car was not out of
the ordinary and was about the same speed
as the ordinary careful driver would drive
on that road~

A.

That is what I would say.

Q.

And the only other movement of the car excepting its forward movement that you o1bserved was the fact that when it approached
the 1back end of your car the car moved over
to the lefthand side of the highway, went
around your car~ (T. 42-3-4-5-6-7)

Q.

After the truck passed you did you see it
turn back over on to the right side of the
road~

A.

Well, about all I could see it was going down
the road.
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Q.

Didn't it turn back over onto the righthand
side of the road~

.l\..

I don't recall it did.

Q.

It just went straight on up the road as far
as you remember it?

A.

As far as I know.

Q.

There wasn't anything disturbing at all in
the manner in which it went up the road, was
there~

A.

There didn't seem to be.

Q.

Apparently just normal movement of the car
as it went on up the street~

A.

That is the way it seemed to me.

(T. 48)

Bert Karen did not move Curwood but left him on
the road, lying on his stomach. He and his brother Lawrence then drove to Harry AuMiller's store at Jensen
where Sainmy Hatch, State Highway Patrolman, was
notified by telephone of the accident. About f'Orty minutes later Hatch met them at the store and Bert Karen
and Hatch returned to the scene of the accident. Lawrence Karen was left at the service station in a drunken
condition~ When they got back to the scene of the accident a Burlington bus had stopped with its lights shining
on the body and the driver had put out flares to keep
traffic away from the area, (T. 50). On redirect examination by Mr. Colton, Bert Karen testified that he did
not show Mr. Hatch the approximate location of where
his truck was stopped the night of the accident.
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You mean take him out there and show him?
No the night of the accident did you~strike
th~t; You stated to Mr. McCuUough that this
was the general location but the exact spot,
you don't know?
A. No, I don't know if this was the exact spot
or not.
Q. Now, I ask you a question, did you show Mr.
Hatch the night of the accident the approximate location where you parked your car
when you stopped?
A. I don't believe I did." (T. '56).

''A.
Q.

On recross examination by
ness testified as follows:
'' Q.

~1r.

McCu11ough the wit-

And you didn't show Mr. Hatch at any time
where you parked the car on the road, did
you?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

You couldn't tell the make of the truck, if it
was a truck that passed, as you have ·indicated, you couldn't tell the make of the truck~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Couldn't tel~ the color of the truck¥

A.

No, I couldn't say that I could.

Q.

And you watched those clearance lights for
some time as it went up the road, didn ' t you~
1

A.
Q.

Yes, I would say I thought it was a long time,
but seconds anyway.
\Yell, as it went up the road you could see
those clearance lights for at least a quarter
or a half mile, couldn't you¥
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A.

Well, see them for quite a long ways up the
road." (T. 60-1).

At this point in the testimony the court took the noon
recess. After the noon recess the witness was recalled
to the stand and on redirect examination stated that he
had made a mistake in his previous testimony and that
he had shown Sammy Hatch where he had parked his
pickup truck on the night of the accident and that Sammy
Hatch had made a cross on the ,edge of the road right
where the Karen truck had been parked. (T. 71). On
recross examination he reluctantly admitted that he had
talked to the prosecuting officials about this testimony
during the noon recess. ( T. 78). The change in this
witness' testimony was necessary for the admission of
·pictures offered by the State of the exact location of the
accident and particularly State's Exhibits A, J and 0.
Bert Karen testified that he did not know where ~ir.
Curwood was struck, or the position he was in on the
road when he was struck, or whether he was lying down,
or whether he was standing up, or what his position may
have been at the time he was struck. As far as he knew
Curwood could have been 'lying right on the road when
he was struck by the car. (T. 53).
The meager testimony of Lawrence Karen, the brother of Bert Karen, is of little value in determining what
happened at the scene of the accident. This witness admitted that he was in a drunken condition. He classified
his state of intoxication as being "medium drunk." (R.
90-1-2). This witness rt.estified that besides the beer which
he consumed, he drank from six to eight glasses of whis1
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key before he left Artesia to return to Vernal at about
2:00 o'clock in the morning. He testified he was riding
with his brother Bert and the deceased Curwood in a
pickup truck; that his brother Bert was driving the truck;
that he was on the righthand side and Curwood was in the
center; that they stopped the truck someplace east of the
river at Jensen and "we all got out for a littl.e relief."
(T. 82) He got out on the righthand side. He doesn't
know what side the deceased got out of the truck as he
did not see him until after the accident occured. ('T. 83).
After getting out of the truck the witness went down into
the borrow pit to take care of the wants of nature, saw
some lights coming down the road and turned his back
to 'them because of the act he was performing at the
time in reHeving himself. (T. 96-7). The next thing he
heard was a thump. Then he heard a ''pi tty pat'' down
the pavement and saw someone running down the pavement. He climbed out of the borrow pit and ran down the
road. He saw Jimmy Curwood on the lefthand side ofthe
pav:ement and his brother was standing over him. Curwood's head was down and my brother said "my God, he
is dead'' and said well don't touch him, let's get the law.
In a moment or so they ran back to the truck and went to
Jensen to call the law. (T. 84)' He testified that ithree or
four minutes elapsed from the time they stopped the
truck until he heard the bump. ('T. 85). The witness
further testified as follows :
'' Q.

In other words, Sammy HaJ~h told you that
the accident happened around about three
o'clock~
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A.

He said that was about the time he got there,
or got the call.

Q.

And upon what he told you, you concluded
you must have left Artesia around two o'clock
in the morning1

A.

Approximately about that.

Q.

And that is the only way you can place the
time, by what Sammy Hatch told you?
'

A.

Yes, sir, that's all the time I had.

Q.

And if Sammy Hatch hadn't told you that
you wouldn't have known when you left Artesia, would you 1

A.

No, sir.

Q. When you stopped down at the plac~ somewhere east of the river, or down at Jensen,
you say you got out the righthand side of
the truck?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And went down into the borrow pit?

A.

Yes, sir, stepped off-

Q.

Did you take care of the wants of nature?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the lights that were coming down the
road, you turned your back to them~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Because of the act you were performing at
the time in reHeving yourself 1

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the next thing you heard was a thump1
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A. Yes, sir.
Q,, And after you heard the thump the next thing
you heard, you said about three or four
seconds or minutes after the thump or bump,
you heard someone running down the road 1
A. Y~es, sir.
Q. And did you see where the lights of this car
had gone by this time~
·
A. No, sir, I didn't pay any attention to the
lights of that truck.
·
Q. The only time you ever saw any lights of the
car that came down the road was when you
got out into a thistle patch and the lights
were coming down the road and you turned
your back, and you never saw the lights after
that on the car~
A.

No, sir.

Q.

That's correct, isn't

A.

That's right.

Q.

Then when you heard someone running down
'the road you went down the road too, didn't

it~

you~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When you went down the road did you see
any blood for a distance of approximately
179 feet leading east from where you 8aw
something lying in the road~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did you see any smears of blood for a distance of thirty or forty feet running east of
where the person, or whoever it was that
was in the road?
'
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A.

No, sir.

Q.

Didn't see any blood at that time all?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Then when you got down there you stayed
only a couple of seconds, didn't you.

A.

I would say approximately that, yes, sir.

Q.

Then you went back to your truck, you and
your brother?

.A_

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the person that you saw in the road was
Jimmy Curwood?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Where was the person of Jimmy Curwood at
the time you saw him in the road~

A.

It was on the southwest side of the highway.

Q.

That would he on the 1efthand ·side as you
are coming towards Vernal?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

How far from the lefhand edge of the pavement?

A.

I couldn't say as to that, that is, accurately.
I would say possibly, from the approximation,
maybe two or three feet.

Q.

You didn't observe it carefully?

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Then you went hack to your car.

A.

Yes, sir.
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Q.

On your way back to your car did you see
any blood from the person of Mr. Curwood
stretching out for 179 fee~t~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Did you see any smear of blood running down
the road to the east, or toward Artesia, from
the person of Mr. Curwood for a distance of
thirty or forty feet~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Then you drove on into Au Miller's or into
Jensent

A.

Y·es, sir.

Q.

And left Mr. Curwood out there on the road T

A.

Yes, sir." (T. 96-7-8-9).

S. D. HATCH, 'State Highway P~trolman, testified
that he recived a call at his home at 3:18a.m. that there
had been an accident on Highway 40; that he immediately dressed and went out on the road; that he observed
a large red Federal truck coming into Vernal on Highway
40 and about 3rd East Street; that he waived the truck
down between 4th and 5th East 'Street; that the truck
pulled over to the side of the road and he walked around
to the door on the driver's side and recognized the defendant, Dean Peterson, as the driver. He had a conversation as follows:
'' Q.

Will you state to us in substance or effect
the conversation then had between you and
Mr. Peterson~

A.

I asked him if he had been-as near as I
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recall my exact words were, 'How far eas t
have you been, Dean~' To which he replied,
'I have been out to Wileys. ' I said, 'Did you
just come in from Wileys ~' 'Yes,' that was
his answer, 'yes.' And at that time I asked
him to step out of the truck.
1

Q.

And did he~

A.

He stepped out, yes.'' ( T. 116).

He testified that the defendant had an odor of intoxicating liquor on his breath and from his observation
and conversation he concluded that he was under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. He found a whiskey
flask with some whiskey in it and a full coca-cola bottle
in the cab of the truck. 'The City Marshal, Calvin Jorgenson, came up about that time and Mr. Hatch instructed him to take the defendant to the police station and
to hold his truck until he returned. At thaJt time Mr.
Hatch testified that there was some damage to the left
front headlight and fender of the truck as shown by the
pictures, State's Exhibits F and G. ·The defendant
denied having an accident or running over any person.
Pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Hatch, Calvin J orgenson, the night marshal, told the defendant to drive the
truck to the police station, which he did. Mr. Hatch
testified that the examination of the truck and the conversation with Mr. Peterson occupied approximately five
minutes. (T. 271). That he stopped Peterson at 3:25
a.m.; about 3 :30 he started toward Jensen and when
he got just beyond the GaJteway Cafe, which is on about
8th East Street, he stopped another truck, a water tank
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truck ·of F. R. Finley which was being driven by a party
by the name of John Gibbs. He took Mr. Gibb's chauf~
feur·'s licensH and told him to drive the truck up to the
police station. He watched to see if they were complfing
with his instructions and when they turned off Highway
40 toward the police station he concluded that they wo'uld
comply with his orders. He went on to Jensen wh~re
he picked up Bert Karen at the Au Miller store but left
Lawrence Karen sitting on the pump standard. They
then drove to the scene of the accident. There ·was an
apparently life1ess man lying on the rDad; a Burlington
bus heading east had its headlights shining on the body
and ·the bus driver Spike Hayworth, had put flares
around the area to keep traffic away. (T. 130-2). The
body was lying face down; the head east and the i~eet
to the· wesit; the head was about fourteen or fifteen
inches from the edge of the pavement and one leg was
stretched out partly on the paved surface and partly
on the north shoulder. ('T. 134). The hody was then
put on a blanket and lifted to the side of 1the road. There
was a pool of blood about seventeen or ·eighteen ·inches
in diameter where the man's head had lain. Sheriff
H. N. Snyder of Uintah County arrived· at the scene of
the accident and assisted Mr. Hatch in making certain
measuremenrts. That 34 fe~et east of the pool of b~ood
they found one shoe on the road on one side of the· center
~ine and 54 feet east they found another shoe on the
other side of the center line. (T. 137). The shoes were
offered and received in evidence and later identified as
shoes belonging to the deceased, who was in the habit
1

1
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of ;wearing shoes without shoe laces. Hatch testified that
B~rt ·Karen had told him that he parked as near as he
could recall at a place about forty-two steps east of the
bodythat was on the road. ('T. 139). Hatch and Sheriff
Snyde1· returned to the police s:tation and questioned the
defendant about his movements on Saturday night, the
6th, and Sunday morning, the 7th.
: When Mr. Hatch and the sheriff returned to the
police station and further questioned the defendant concerning the accirent, the defendant again reiterated that
he· knew nothing about the accident. When asked about
the damage to his left headlight, he said he did nolt know
when it occured; that his sister had driven the truck
the day before but he had not noticed the damage until it
was called to his attention by Mr. Hatch.
· About 6 :30 in the morning and 'Shortly after daybreak Mr. Hatch again returned to the scene of the accident and made numerous measurements as shown by his
testimony. He testified there was a smear of blood
aboutt. six or seven inches wide running back east of the
body along the north side of the highway some forty feet;
th,e blood then thinned out on the pavement to a point
179 feet east of the body. ('T. 150-154). 'The Karen car
was parked 126 feet east of the large pool of blood where
Curwood was found and the blood was in evidence 179
feet east of the pool. (T. 153). The following excerpts
from the witness' testimony are pertinent:
'' 'Mr. Hatch, you stated you saw a smear
of blood. State what you saw there.
'A. Well, there was, fr01n this patch of blood
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which I ~testified to that it was approximately
. there wa:s
eighteen or twenty' inches across 1t,
a smear of blood that run back up the highway as far as I could track it, down to the
drop-just littie mere flakes of blood on the
rocks, was 179 feet; from the clot of blood
back, I didn't measure it, but ab,out thirty
or forty feet this sme·ar was very prominent,
omd you could stand b.ack and se.e it very
clearly.'
Is that what you testified at the pr·eliminary
hearing~

A.

That's right.

Q.

Now on page 75:

'Then the blood was over on the lefthand
side of the road, was it~
A.

Right.

Q.

How far from the lefthand side 6f the hard
surface of the road area~

A.

W·ell the center of the blood spot, I imagine
about twelve inches; the outside edge of the
blood spot was over near the edge of the
paved surface.
1

Q.

A.

And then leading hack from that hlood ·pool,
or area about ·eighteen inches in diameter,
you traced blood back. about 179 feet'
Yes, sir.

And there was a smear of blood on the hard
surface area, wasn't there~
A. Yes.
Q.

Q.

For how long?
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A.

There was a smear of blo1od for about thirty
or ~orty feet.

Q.

And it was a very pronounced spot, was
not?

A.

Yes, very plain.

Q.

Is that what you testified to?

A.

Yes, I believe that is my testimony.

Q.

And further:

~t

'All right, for thirty ~or forty feet back this
smear of blood was very pronownced omd was
discern~ible, was it not?
A.

Right.'
Is that your further testimony?

A.

That's right." ('T. 260-261)

On direct examination the witness testified as fo'llows:
'' Q.

I think your testimony yesterday, or the
day before, I think you testified that when
you went out there in the morning you could
not detect any tire marks in any of the blood
areas at all; that is your testimony in this
cause?

A.

The first trip?

Q.

No, the s·econd trip.

A.

No, I didn't testify that on the second trip.
The first trip I testified we didn't find any
tire marks in the blood.

Q.

'Veil, I will have to find it from the reporter.
Didn't you testify yes,terday that when you
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went out there and it came daylight is when
you first saw the smear of blood~
A.

That's right.

Q.

That you couldn't find any tire marks in any
of the blood areas~

A.

Yes, as far as tread was concerned, yes, I
testified to that.

Q.

And in the preliminary hearitng you tes~ified
the same thing, that there were no tire rrvarks
or skid marks ~or brake marks in the are.a
of the bZood otr the scene of the accident,
didn't you?

A.

That's right." (T. 286).

Notwithstanding this bloody mess that was present
at the scene of the accident, not a drop of human Mood
was ever found on the defendant's truck. A spot of
blood was found on a U-bolt which wa;s. sawed off and
sent to the F.B.I. There was also some hair found on
the under carriage of the truck which was sent to the
F.B.I. The report showed 1the spot of blood was not
human blood but animal blood and the hair was squirrel
hair. (T. 2'56-257). The following testimony of Mr.
Hatch is pertinent:
"Q.

You didn't fond ~a spot of human bto~od aJY11!J
place upon the truck of Deo;n, Peters10fb, did
you?

A.

Nto, sir.

Q.

And you searche1d the truck ftrom the front bo
the back and all und,~r the undercarriage, and
all over the entire c1ar, and you didn't find
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on.e solitary drop of hunwrn blood on the c,a,r,
did you?
A.
"·Q.

That's right." (T. 257).
X·otwithstanding the oondition that t his body
was in, notwithst:anding the fact that the.re
was a po,ol of blood there eighteen of!' twenty
inches in diameter and half an inch deeiP, and
t.hat this blood, when it g~ot maylight you could
see a very p1'1omJirnent, discernible smear of
blood reachimg ~out to the e:ast ~award Artesia
thirty 10r forty feet, and evidence of the: blood
continuing ·On fior another distance, making
a total,of 179 feet, notwithsttlanding the mutilated condition you. found the body ,as you
have now described, you didn't find .a single
solitMy drop of human blo1od on the truck,
dlid you.?
A. I did not.'' ( T. 283-284).
1

In attempting to connect the Peterson 1truck with
the accident, Mr. S. D. Hatch testified that he found a
human tooth on the top of the front ax'le of the Peterson
truck, which tooth was later identified by Dr. Stevens, a
dentist, as the tooth that was missing from the mouth
of the deceased. A careful analysis of this testimony
leads to but one conclusion, that the testimony is not
worthy of belief. In the first place, Mr. Hatch claimed
he found the tooth about 6 :30 in the morning just after
daybreak, lying on the top of a convexed axle about a
foot from the wheel and at a point where the axle was
from 13_4 to 214 inches wide. ( T. 285). It was lying
in some oil or grease at that point. The testimony was
offered that the tooth was knocked out of the deceased's
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mouth at the time of the accident and lodged on the top
of this convexed axle. If the ~tooth was found on the
top of the axle as the State's witnes·s would have us
believe, then the he.ad of the deceased had to come in
contact with the undercarriage of the truck. 'The bloody
condition of the road as herein set forth and the terrible
mutilated condition of the body as testified to by Mr.
Hatch ('T. 170) clearly demands that the obj·ect which
caused these situations must have come in contact with
a great amount of blood from the person of the deceased,
and yet the undisputed evidence in the case from the
State ''S own witness, shows that lthere was not a single
solitary drop of human blood found on the Peterson
truck. The Peterson truck is a 3~-ton F·ederal truck
and from the place of the accident would have to travel
approximately ten miles over rough roads with a human
tooth 'lying on the top of a convexed axle not exceeding
21,4 inches in width. This is impossible to believe and
when we find in the evidence the testimony of Ralph
Hatch, a servioe staJtion operator and relative of S. D.
Hatch, that he steam cleaned with live steam with 40
to 60 lbs. pressure the chassis of this truck two days
before the accident ( T. 568-569) the possibility of the
tooth riding on such an axle while the truck was travelling ten miles over comparatively rough roads is wholly
fanciful and. beyond credence. The inconsistent testimony
of S. D. Hatch and Dr. J. W. Stevens lends further
force to the incredibility of this evidence. Mr. Hatch
testified at the preliminary hearing thaJt he found the
tooth about 6 :30 in the morning just after daybreak
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when he first returned from the scene of the accident
and at that time he showed the tooth to Dr. Stevens.,
who was standing on the sidewalk beside the truck.
Dr. Stevens testified that he was not on the sidewalk
at 6 :30 in the morning; that he did not see the tooth
until sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the
morning when Mr. Hatch showed it to him after he had
been examining the truck. (T. 359). The following testimony is pertinent:

''Q.

Mr. Hatch, you were read a couple of sentences out of your testimony at the preliminary hearing found on page 86. So that the
jury and the Court will know the entire context of your testimony at that point, I want
to ask you, beginning with page 85, if this
is not your complete testimony with reference
to the time that you found that tooth, and if
you didn't testify as follows at the preliminary hearing, beginning up about a third of
the way down:

·' Q. Now whether anybody had been under the

truck making an examination prior to the
time that you made your examination, between five and six o'clock in the morning of
September 7, you don't know that do you~

A.

I do not.

Q.

When you got back there was the defendant's
mother and fa;ther there 1

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

What1

A.

Yes.
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What they had done to make an examination
of that truck you don't know, do you'
A. No, I don't know whether they made an examination of it or not.
Q. What time Sunday morning was it when you
found the 1tooth on top of the front ax'lef

Q.

That w·as when I made the e;namimation, right
.after daylight. I ·don't know what the oorrect
time was, bu.t it was as· soon as it gat daylight.
Q. That was betw:e;en five arnd six o'clock in the
morning 1then?

A.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you found the taoth at that time on
of the a;nle?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Arnd there isn't any question toot that statement is true; is 1tnat correct?

A.

No question a~ all.'
Is that what you so testified to at the preliminary hearing~

t~op

A. Yes, that is my testimony.
'Q. If Dr. Stevens wasn't ther·e between five and
six o'clock in 'the morning then you didn't
hand it to him at that time you found it, did
you~

MR. COL.TON: We obj·ect to that question
as being duplicitus.
Q. I will withdraw the question. When you
found the tooth between five and six o'clock
in ~the morning, Dr. Stevens wasn't there to
see it?
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A.

If it was between five and six.

Q.

Well, you told us it was just about daylight 1

A. Yes.
Q. And you told us it was between five and six
o'Clock in the morning less than two minutes
ago?
,

A. I said that.'
MR. COLTON: Just a minute. I think counsel should read whaJt the record indicates here,
that he was interrupted in his answer.
MR. McCULLOUGH: I wouldn't say that,
I will say what the record shows.

•Q. And you told us it was between five and six
o'clock in the morning not less than two
minutes ago?
A. I said that.'
Then, there is a dash by the reporter.

'Q. Wait a minute. Did you tell us less than
two minutes ago that it was between five and
six o'clock in the morning? If you didn't,
I will have the reporter read it.
MR. COL'TON: Well, let him answer.
A.

I believe I s1tated if that was the time, it
was after daylight, and if it was between five
and six o'clock that was the time.

Q.

Well it wouldn't be between nine and ten
o'clock in the morning, would it?

A.

No.

'•·.'···

Q.

And the time that you are talking about you
were there, right after daybreak?
A. Yes.
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Q. And the people you tell us a'bout as being
there were there right after daybreak.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Including Dr.
A.

Stevens~

Yes.'
Is that what your testimony was, Mr. Hatch T
,-

A.

That is my testimony." ('T. 293 to 296)

DR. STEVENS POSITIVELY TESTIFIED THAT
HE DID NOT SEE S. D. HATCH JUS.T AFTER
DAYLIGHT BETWEEN FIVE AND 8IX O'CLOCK
IN !THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 7th; THAT HE
DID NOT SEE THE TOOTH IN QUESTION UNTIL
SAMMY HATCH SHOWED IT 'TO HIM BETWEEN
NINE AND TEN O'CLOCK SUNDAY MORNING.
('T. 358-9).
The accuracy of Dr. Stevens testimony is equally
dubious. At the preliminary hearing, Dr. Stevens testified that the tooth which he examined and filed his
initials '' J. W. '' in, was the upper right first bicuspid.
('T. 345-346). On his cross examination at the tria'l, this
witness became very much disturbed when he perceived
that the tooth had been examined by defendant's experts
and then he changed his testimony, stating that the tooth
in question was a second bicuspid and not the upper
right first bicuspid as he testified to at the preliminary
hearing; that he had made a mistake in his testimony
at the preliminary hearing. ( T. 346, 350-1-2). The doctor further testified at the trial that he identified the
tooth by reason of 1the fact that he had us·ed an explorer
found in the undertaking parlor to probe into the socket
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33
of. the n1issing tooth and discovered that the tooth was
broken off in there; that part of the root structure was
still there, that, the Apical end was still there in the
socket. He reluctantly confirmed his testimony given
at the preliminary hearing as shown by the following
~testimony:

"Q.

Now you say, you testified here a few minutes ago that there was an instrument over
at the undertaking parlor that looked 'like,what was that instrument, that you called i1t1

A..

Oh, it was an explorer, prober, several instruments over there.

Q.

And you say from that explorer you determined that the socket of this missing toorth
in the cadaver's mouth, you say that there
was a tooth broken off in there.

A.

Part of the root structure was still 1there,
the A pical end was still there in the socket.

Q.

I will ask you if you testified as follows at
the preliminary hearing when this question
or such a matter was talked about whether
you could tell there was any broken tooth,
on page 52:

'Q. And that is app11oximately the size that would,
fit into tha,t missing tooth, otr the cav~ty of
the missilng tooth, is it woctor?
Q.

Yes, sir.
w,as the tooth broken 0 ff?

A.

The tooth was, yes.

Q.

Was the rest of the tooth in the cavity or
was it knocked out, too?

A.

1
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A.

Q.

I can't tell you that; there was no X-roy
made.
· ·.. ~Ju
Did you make an e;vamination t·o determ.ime
that?
· ·_;, ~

A.

No, the blood was clotted in the socket
I didn't probe to see about that.

Q.

But the socket was ther1e, was it; you could
see tha.t?

atfui

Yes.
Q. The balance of the to1oth, you couldn't detieimine whethe·r it was iJn the s·ocket or not?

A.

A.

No.

Q.

Nor you dJidn't determine that?

A.

No.'
Isn't that what you test:ified vo?

A.

I d.i.dn't tremember probing for that root at
the time.

Q.

Just a minut·e. I am -asking you if that is
what you. testified at the prelimilrtary he:aring?
·

A.

Yes.

Q.

Then in face of that sworn testimony you
come into oourt now and tell us that you did
exac#I!J opposite jr1om what you testJified?

A.

I made a mistake in telling you I didn't probe
for that booth, lor I did." (T. 3·53-3154).

The testimony of JOHN D. GIBBS. lends further
credence to the fact that the Peterson truck was not
involved in this acciden1t. Gibbs is an entirely disinterSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ested· witness. He is a graduate of the University of
Oklahoma and a surveyor for the 'Texas Company. In
co-mpany with a Mr. Gump, he left Artesia for V·ernal,
Utah, a few 1ninutes before 2:00 o'clock on the morning
of September 7th. He saw Dean Peterson at the H & H
Cafe in Artesia about 10:00 o'clock on Saturday ev;ening. There was nothing abnormal about the manner
in which he talked nor the manner in which he walked.
He again saw Mr. Peterson at the Club 40 around midnight. He heard him talking to different people at that
place, observed his actions and, from his observation,
he was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
He and ~fr. Gump IJ.eft Artesia about 2:00 o'clock driving a water truck of the H. R. Findley Company. (T.
128). They were travelling toward Vernal on Highway
40 .. They passed a number of passenger vehicles, including· a passenger bus about the time they arrived at the
Colorado line. When they were about eight miles east
of . Artesia at a point known as the junction of the
Bonanza road with Highway 40, the Peterson truck
driven by Dean Peterson passed them going toward
Vernal. Mr. Gibbs positively identified the truck as
the one he had ·seen in Artesia and many times before
in Vernal. He definitely identified the truck from defendant's Exhibit "3" and also identified the sam·e truck
when he reached the police station when ordered to
report there by Highway Patrolman '8. D. Hatch. He
testified that· Peterson was travelling about 35 Iniles per
hour and that they followed close behind him until 1they
got up about the Jensen bridge. The Jensen bridge is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
east of the point of the alleged accident and cros·ses
the .Green River at the little town known as Jensen.
The clearance lights and tail lights of the Peterson
truck were in their vision from the time the truck left
the Bonanza road to the Jensen bridge, where the road
turns. They lost sight of the Peterson truck as they
slowed down ~to see if the cafe was open at J·ensen.
Mr. Gibbs testified he did not observe any pickup truck
parked on the righthand side of the road as you go
toward Vernal between the Bonanza road and the Jensen
bridge. (T. 403). They did not observe any object in the
road 'like a human body and they saw no evidence of
any accident between those points. They had good sealed
beam headlights on their truck. Had there been any
pickup truck parked on the righthand side of the road
or if any body had been lying in the road they would
have seen it during the ride from Bonanza road to the
Jensen bridge. They were stopped by Highway PatrolmanS. D. Hatch on Highway 40 near the Gat·eway Cafe.
This was five minU!tes after Dean Peterson's truck had
been flagged down by Sammy Hatch. ('T. 271). Sammy
Hatch took the driver's license of Mr. Gump and ordered him to go to the city offices and leave his truck
and remain there until Hatch returned. They did as they
were ordered and went to the city office and ther·e saw
the P~terson truck parked outside ·and Mr. Peterson,
who was waiting in the office. The truck they saw was
the same truck which they followed from the Bonanza
road right up to the Jensen bridge. ( T. 40). After they
arrived, defendant's father, mother and sister came to
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the city office. Gibbs was with the Peterson family,
including the defendant, for about 2~ hours during
which time they examined the truck very carefully. He
had occasion to talk with Dean Peterson throughout the
period. He heard many questions propounded to Dean
by his mother and father and the replies which Dean
made to these questions. (T. 410). ·That during said
time Dean Peterson's speech was coherent. He was normal as he wa'lked around and examined the truck. That
he did not observe the odor of intoxicating liquor on his
breath. That if there had been intoxicating liquor on
his breath he would have sensed it as he talked with
him throughout the 2~-hour period which he was with
them at the city offices. (T. 411-412). That during the
examination of the truck by the Peterson family and
himself and Mr. Gump, no one stopped them in their
examination, including Night 1\Iarshal Calvin Jorgenson.
They left the city offices around 6:00 o'clock in the
morning and came back between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock,
when Mr. Gump got his driver's licens·e back and they
picked up the water truck and left. This witness clearly
exonerated Mr. Peterson from any participation in the
a'lleged accident.
MR. JEFF L. DAVIS, a married man·· with two
children and a resident of Orem, Utah, who formerly
lived at Craig, Colorado, testified that he was living
in Craig, Colorado, on September 6th and at that time
he did not know any of the Peterson family, including
Dean Peterson; that he was working for Chester Watson
a t Craig, Colorado. That prior to that time he had
1
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stored some furniture over at Vernal at the home, of
Mrs. Harvey Knight. That he hired a Ford pickup truck
from the firm of Jones & Laughlin to go to Vernal to
pick up his furniture in storage and bring it to Craig
where he was residing. In company with a driver by
the name of Jones he left Craig around 8:00 o'clock
Sa;turday night, September 6th. He arrived in Vernal
about midnight. After getting their furniture loaded
at Mrs. Knight's hom·e they left Verna'l for Craig, :Colorado, after 1 :30 a.m. Sunday morning September 7th.
(T. 543-5). They were travelling on Highway 40 between 20 and 25 miles an hour with a load of furniture.
The witness had gone over this road many times before
and was familiar with the various land marks. They
went over the Green River bridge at Jensen. When
they were about 17 miles out of Vernal or about 4 miles
east of Jensen, a ·1941 Chevrolet passed them going
toward Artesia. When the car passed they were on a
curve just as the road starts up a long grade. When
the car passed them it was steaming, that is the steam
was coming out of the radiator. The passenger car was
travelling somewhere around 55 or 60 miles an hour.
The hill or grade was about a mil.e and a quarter long.
They continued to watch the car and just before it got
to the top of the grade it stopped because it had got so
hot that the engine froze up. When they got up to the
car they noticed that the radiator and the grill. were
caved in and the righthand fender was badly damaged.
The radiator was "plumb dry" with a large hole in the
radiator. There were two men and three girls. The
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two nwn were so drunk they couldn't talk. The gi~ls
said they were out of water and they hit a colt or some-.
thing down by Jensen. (T. 548). They hooked a chain
on the damaged Chevrolet automobile and started to pull
the·Chevro'let into Artesia. The man steering the Chevrolet, because of his drunken condition, could not guide
it and ~Ir. Jones went back and steered the car while
Davis drove the pickup truck to the Jones Trucking
Company in Artesia. It was after 3:00 o'cloek when they
got to Artesia. When they stopped at Artesia they
examined the Chevrolet. 'There was a five-inch hole in
the radiator, the fender was pretty well smashed in
and rubbing on the tire, the bumper was bent down. ( T.
551). They left the Chevrolet at Artesia and then drove
on into Craig. The fact that this witness is entirely disinterested and his testimony :remained absolutely unimpeached, notwithstanding he gave the names of prominent people in Vernal who could easily verify his presence at Vernal at the times which he testified to, no
effort was ever made by the prosecution to impeach his
testimony. It is clear that this Chevrolet car participated in the accident in question as no other accident
was reported on this nighl
Another enigma arises in this case when George
Engen and his wife, Elsie Engen, two prominent citizens
of Jensen, who operate the cafe known as Mom's Cafe,
testified in support of defendant's Motion for a New
Trial that on Sunday, :September 7, 1947, at the hour
of 3 :15 A.M. when :they were about to close their cafe,
Bert Karen and his brother, Lawrence, drove up to the
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~afe. 'That Bert Karen went over 'to Harry Au Miller's

house next to the cafe to get him to phone. While Bert
Karen was getting Harry Au Miller, Mr. and Mrs.
Engen came' out in front of their cafe and asked Lawrence Karen what was the matter. Lawrence Karen
replied, ''We had a fight o;nd the son of a bitch got out
to piss and Bert 'rian over him." Mr. and Mrs. Engen
saw the red Federal tru~k driven by Dean Peterson
approximately fifteen minutes before the Karen brothers
arrived at the cafe. See affidavit in support of motion
for new trial, R. 46, and the testimony of these witnesses,
T. 733 to 76'5.
Defendant, Joseph Dean Peterson, took the stand
in his own defense. Mr. Peterson had overseas campaign
service for approximately four years ; he was wounded
by shrapnel in his face which made one side of his face
out of line with the other; that he did not drive the
Federa'l truck anytime during the day of September 6th
but that his sister was driving the truck during that
day; that he got through work at his father ''S mill about
7:00 o'clock in the evening and drove over to Jensen
on business and later to Artesia. He had one drink about
7:00 o'clock in the evening from the bottle which he
purchased at Vernal to treat his business associates at
Jensen. That the bottle was never opened after leaving
Jensen. The remainder of this bottle was found by
Sammy Hatch in his truck along with a coca-cola miXer.
The :bottle bore a Utah liquor stamp and was more than
half full after five peop1e had a drink out of it at ,Jensen.
· (T. 583). He went over to Artesia for the purpose of
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getting a permit to haul flour into Colorado. That he had
some beer at Artesia but did not drink any hard liquor.
(T. 588, 591). That he did not have any accident with
his truck as alleged by the prosecution and he was not
under the influence of intoxicating liquor at anytime
during the night of September 6th and the early morning of September 7th. The great preponderance of the
evidence substantiates this latter statement. There was
no urinalysis made. S. D. HATCH and SHERIFF
SNYDER testified that in their opinion he was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, but the Colorado
officer, JOE TOBLER, who observed him throughout
the evening, refused to testify that he was intoxicated
and in answer to the question as to whether or not he
was intoxicated, said that all he would say was ;fuat he
had been drinking. (T. 332).
Another member of the Colorado State Patrol, C.
P. ALLISON, testified in relation to the condition of
the defendant, that about 10:00 o'clock in :the ev·ening
he noticed the smell of liquor on his breath. (T. 373).
CALVIN JORGENSON, the night marshal at Vernal, testified that defendant was under the influence of
intoxicating liquor and when asked why he permit:ted
him to drive his truck if he was in that condition, answered "yes" to the following question: "So you let
him drive the truck under the influence of intoxicating
liquor rather than leave your car and get in his truck
to take him up to the city office? Is that your answer?
Yes, sir.''
The defendant's witnesses, who were pres·ent from

QSI
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the time that Dean Peterson· arrived at the police stati<;>n at about 3 :30. A.M. to the time he was taken t9 jail
at 6:00 o'clock in the morning, al'l testified tha;t th.ere
was .no evidence of intoxication or that Dean Peterson
was under the influence of liquor at that time. JOHN
D. GIBBS, a tot~lly disinterested witness,. who talked
and associated with Peterson during those 2~ hours,
testified definitely that there was no evidence of intoxication as far as the defendant was concernedl'ffurt he
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Justice of the Peace at Artesia, MR. WILLIAM H. SAHLI,
and MRS. ADAIR BRIMHALL, who observed the defendant throughout the evening, testified tha;t he was
not under the influence of liquor at anytime while he was
in Artesia. The fact that the Colorado highway patrol
officers refused to testify that he was under the influence
of liquor has considerable probative force. The most the
prosecution. could get from these witnesses was that, in
their opinion, the defendant had been drinking.
MR. ELISHA W ARN~R, Commissioner of the
State Tax Commission, t·estified that on the 28th of June,
1947, the driver's license of Dean Peterson was revoked
by the State Tax Commission and the defendant. was
not. present at the revocation her·ein; that the action of
the Commission was predicated upon the report from
Justice of the Peace Wayne Johnson at Springville, Utah,
that· defendant was convicted of driving a car under the
influence of liquor. The trial court refused defendant the
right to present evidence that there was no such a conviction ever had in the justice court of Wayne Johnson.
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS

i. The court erred in overruling defendant's tno·tion to strike the entire testimony of Elisha Warner
covering revocation of the driver's license of the defendant. (T. 227).
_2. The court erred in receiving in evidence State's
Exhibit N, the certified copy of the order of revocation
of defendant's driver's license. (T. 227, 228).
3. The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the State's offer to introduce in evidence the
testimony of Elisha Warner taken on his voir dire examination, covering the transcript from page 212 to
225.
The court erred in overruling defendant's motion
to dismiss the information and discharge the defendan:t;
said motion was. made at the close of the State's case.
Grounds for said motion are contained in transcript
pages 388 to 389.
5. The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction No.1. (R. 22, T. 728).
4.

6. The court erred in failing to give defendant's
requested instruction No.2. (R. 23, T. 728).
7. The court erred in refusing to give def·endant's
requested instruction No.3. (R. 24, T. 728).
8. The court erred in failing to give defendant's
requested instruction No.4. (R. 25, T. 728).
9. The court erred in failing to give defendant's
requested instruction No.5. (R. 26, T. 728).
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10. The court erred in failing to give defendant's
requested instruction No.6. (R. 27, T. 728).
11. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 1.
(R. 28, T. 728).
12. The court erred in giving Paragraph 2 of said
Instruction No.1. (R. 28, T. 728).
13. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 7 and
each and every part thereof. (R. 31, T. 729).
14. !The court erred in giving that portion of Instruction No. 7 which reads : ''First, operating a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating IJ.iquor.''
(R. 31, T. 729).
15. The court erred in giving that portion of Instruction No. 7 which reads : ''Second, driving while his
driver's liceng,e was revoked." (R. 31, 'T. 729).
1'6. The court erred in giving that portion of Instruction No. 7 which reads: ''And, third, reckless driving, or, in other words, driving in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of others." (R. 31, T. 729).
17. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 8.
(R. 31, T. 729).
18. The court erred in giving that portion of said
Instruction No. 8 which reads, beginning with the sixth
line, "and at such time, and while so operating his
truck he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
and that, being so, he drove his said truck recklessly or
in marked disregard for the safety of the deceased."
(R. 31, T. 729).
19. The court erred in using the word "or" in
line 9 of said Instruction No. 8. (R. 31, T. 729).
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20. · The cowt erred in giVIng Instruction No. 9
and each and every part thereof. (R. 32, T·. 730).
21. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 10
and each and every part thereof. (R. 33, T. 730).
22. The court erred in giving that portion of Instruction No. 10 which reads, beginning with the word
''and'' in the third line, ''And when such an unlawful
act is done recldessly or with marked disr·egard for the
safety of others." (R. 33, T. 730).
23. The court erred in giving that portion of said
Instruction No. 10 beginning with the word "and" in the
13th line, which reads as follows: ''And that he drove
his said truck recklessly or with marked disregard for
the safety of the deceased." (R. 33, T. 730).
24. The court ·erred in using the word "or" in the
15th line of said Instruction No. 10. (R. 33, T. 730).
25. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 11
and each and every part thereof. (R. 33, T. 730).
26. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 12
and each and every part thereof. (R. 34, T. 730).
27. The court erred in· giving Instruction No. 13
and each and every part thereof. (R. 34, T. 731).
28. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 15
and each and every part thereof. (R. 36, T. 731).
29. The court erred in giving that portion of said
Instruction No. t5 which reads: ''Such negligence, however, does not justify or excuse the defendant from running into or against him with his truck, if you find from
the evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant
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did rnn into or against him with his truck." (R. 36, T.
731).
30. ·Tlie cou:rlt erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new trial. (R. 43, T. 779').
31. The court erred in overruling defendant's obj.ection to the questions propounded to S. D. Hatch as
to whether or not defendant was under the influence of
into~cating liquor as shown by the following testimony:
"Q. And from your observation of the defendant
Joseph Dean Peterson that you have just
testified to as he got out of the truck, and
after he got out of the truck, have you an
opinion as to whether or not he was intoxica.ted f
A.

Ido.

Q.

You may state what that opinion is?

MR. McCULLOUGH: Object to it on the
ground it is immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant, no proper foundation laid to admit it, and
no proper qualification shown of this witness to
testify.
THE COURT: Objection overruled;
A.

Yes, in my opinion he was under the influence
of intoxicating liquor." (T. 120-121).

32. The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the questions propounded to Joe Tobler, a
deputy sheriff of Moffit County, as to whether or not
the. defendant was intoxicated at 12:00 o'clock on the
night of September 6th, as shown by the following testimony:
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"Q. At twelve o'clock when you moved the defendant's truck and observed him at the cafe,
Club 40, what would you say with re'Spect to
his being intoxicated~
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to it' on 'the
ground that it is immaterial, incompetent, irrelevant, too remote, no proper foundation laid to
admit it, and no qualification shown of this .witness to testify.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled.
Q.

You may answer.

A.

We'll, I saw no difference.

Q. Well,

when~

A.

At twelve o'clock or thereabouts.

Q.

What would you say, was he intoxicated or
not at that time?

A.

I would say he had been drinking." ('T. 332).

33. The court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the questions propounded to Calvin Jorgenson,
night marshal of Vernal City, as to whether or not defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
as shown by the following testimony:

"Q.

A.

Now in your opinion, Mr. Jorgenson, was
the defendant under the influence of intoxicating liquor~
Yes, sir.

MR. McCULLOUGH: Just a minute. I move
to strike the answer. I tried to get the objection
in before he answered but he answered too fast
for me.
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THE COURT : The answer may go out for
the objection.
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to it on the
ground no proper foundation laid to admit it,
and no qualification shown in this witness totestify.
'THE COURT: The objection is overruled
and the answer is reinstated." (T. 380-381).
ARGUMENT
Numerous statements of error have been assigned.
Appe'llant will try to organize the Argument to cover
these errors under various heads and propositions.
PROPOSITION I. THE COURT ERRED IN AD:.
MIT'TING TESTIMONY OF THE REVOCATION OF
THE DRIVER'S LICENSE OF THE DEFENDANT.
Statements of Error Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are covered
under the foregoing Proposition. This issue was argued
at length at the tune Elisha Warner, State Tax Commissioner, was called as a witness. Mr. Warner's testimony was first taken on voir dire examination in the
absence of the jury in support of the Sitate 's offer to
show the revocation of the defendant's driver's license.
The defendant objected to the introduction of this testimony on the grounds that it was immaterial, incompetent
and irrelevant and that no proper foundation had been
laid upon which such an offer could be received in evidence. (T. 212-225) The same objections we~e made to
receiving in evidence State's Exhibit N, the certified
copy of the Order of Revocation of defendant's driver's
license. (T. 227-228). Defendant also made a motion to
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strike the entire testimony of Elisha Warner covering
the revocation of the driver's license of the defend8.rit.
(T. 227).
These objections were argued at length before the
trial court. At the conclusion of the argument the court
made its decision, in which he stated the fol'lowing:
''THE COURT: Mr. McCullough, I think
your argument is one this court might be perfectly willing to stand at your shoulder on before
the Supreme Court. It is a little difficult for my
reasoning to follow the reasoning of the decision
in the Lingman case. But this court hasn't any
inclination to attempt to overrule the Supreme
Court. The decision that this court would make
upon this record will put it square'ly. If the law
is going to be changed, the Supreme Court is the
proper tribunal to change it. ·Thus, this being a
voir dire proceeding, and the tender being to show
that this license had been revoked, the court overrules the objection to the introduction of evi-.
dence. The court puts the ruling squarely upon
that decision purposely in order that there can
be no equivocation in the mind of the Supreme
Court if this cas·e reaches there that the ruling ·
is made intentionally, with my analysis and interpretation of the holding of that court. If that
court then desires to change the law or say that
this court has misconceived an interpretation of
its decision, it will be that court to do so. That
wil'l be the holding.
MR. McCULLOUGH: May we have an exception to your Honor's ruling?
THE COURT : Yes.'' ( T. 224-225).
The trial court predicated his decision entirely upon
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th~ case of STATE OF U'TAH v. LINGMAN, 97 Utah
180. Defendant contends tha;t the trial court misconceiv~d the holding of the Lingman case and his interpretation of the opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe went far
afield.
The questioned testimony was offered after all the
testimony was received with reference to the operation
of the truck alleged to have been driven by the defendant. 'There were only two eye witness,es to the operation of this car at the time of the alleged killing of
James Curwood; that was the testimony of Bert E.
Karen and his brother, Lawrence Karen, whose testimony has been fuliy reported in the Statement of Facts
above set forth. Defendant contended in his argument
before the trial court that no competent evidence had
been offered and received upon which any court or jury
could make a finding that the driving of the truck in
question by the defendant without a license had any
causal connection whatsoever with the injuring of James
Cnrwood and his su'bsequent death.
In order that a person may he guilty of a criminal
homicide arising from the negligent operation of an
automobile, or its use for an unlawful purpose, or in
violation of law, it is uniformly held that it must be
shown that such negligent operation, or use for an unlawful purpose or in vio~ation of law, was the direet
and proximate cause of the death; that is, that there
was present a causal connection between the act and
the death. The trial court held that the foregoing is
an adequate statement of the law except that in case
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of driving a car without a license and driving a car under
the influence of liquor were exceptions to the law by
reason of the fact that th.e Supreme Court of Utah had
definitely held in the case of State v. Lingman that it
was not incumbent upon the State to show that such
violations of law were the direct and proximate cause
of the death of the deceased and, furthermore, that .it
was not incumbent upon the State to show any causal
connection between such violations of law and the death
of the deceased. Mr. Justice Wolfe in his ab'le opinion
in the Lingman case certainly does not make any such
exceptions as contended for by the trial court in the
instant case. The following excerpts are pertinent to
this issue:
''. . . Likewise, when one commits a m{sdeineanor, malum in se, it is enough that the
killing occurred in the course of, or by reason of,
such misdemeanor, AS LONG AS 'THERE IS
A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
ACT WHICH IS A MISDEMEANOR AND THE
DEATH. But we think arm (a) also refers to
some acts which are malum prohibitum, but not
all such acts ....
"'There are many other rules for driving
mentioned in Title 57, the infraction of which
may constitute a misdemeanor, but not all ·of
which would constitute the basis for a conviction
for manslaughter IF DEATH SHOULD RESULT FROM THE INFRACTION. Infractions
of rules of traffic may run the gamut from mere
inadvertence or slight omissions to 'any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing
a depraved mind, regardless of human life,' which
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is first degree murder. R. S. 1933, 103-28--3. Concretely illustrated, the gamut of infractions of
the traffic laws may range from all but completely
stopping at a stop sign before entering a sparsely
travelled portion of an arterial highway, to a
drunken driver's madly careening down a traffiCladen street. Death from the former would oruy
give rise to a civil action; from the latter perhaps a charge of murder. Where is the line at
which the infraction becomes more than civil negligence, that is, criminal negligence~ It is not
possible to draw it mathematical!Jy. THE ACCORDION WORDS LIKE 'MERE NEGLIGENCE' AND 'GROSS NEGLIGENCE' OR
'WANTON NEGLIGENCE' SUGGEST COMPARISONS ONLY AND GIVE NO ABSOLUTE
RULE FOR GUIDANCE. WE 'THINK THE
'UNLAWFUL ACT', 'THA'T IS, THE INFRACTION, l\IUST BE DONE IN SUCH A MANNER
AS TO MORE 'THAN CONSTITUTE A MERE
THOUGHTLESS OMISSION OR SLIGHT
DEVIATION FROl\I THE NORM OF PRUDENT CONDUCT. IT MUST BE RECKLESS
OR IN MARKED DISREGARD FOR THE
SAFETY OF OTHERS. WHEN IT DOES
THAT, IT PASSES THE STATE OF MERE
MALUl\I PROHIBITUM AND APPROACHES
THE UNSOCIAL ASPECTS OF MALUM IN
SE. And the spirit of the person while committing the infraction is not a test. A truck driver
seriously bent on meeting a schedule of his rounds
who shoots through an intersection as if he were
driving the only car extant, is just as guilty of
reckless conduct as the driver of a car full of
revelers joyously celebrating a football victory.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
THEREFORE
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY ARM (A) OF
1
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THE
MANSLAUGHTER
DEFINITION
MEANS ~lORE THAN ~fERE THOUGHTLESSNESS OR. SLIGHT CARELESSNESS.
IT :MEANS RECKLESS CONDUCT OR CONDUCT EVINCING A :MARKED DISREGARD
FOR 'THE SAFETY OF OTHERS.
"We now turn to arm (b) of the statute,
R. S. 1933, 103-28-5(2), i.e., the commission of a
lawful act which n1ight produce death (1) done
in an un'lawful manner or ( 2) done without due
care and circumspection. It will be noted that in
this arm the act done contains the ingredient of
'might produce death. 1 Theoretically any act
might produce death. A slight scratch of a pin
'might' produce death. We construe the phras-e
to mean 'fraught with potentialities for produCing death,' illustrations of which are the running
of a car at high speed, however carefully, handling of loaded arms, explosives, deadly germs, etc.
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"The distinct characteristic then of arm (b)
is that the act must be one which has knowable
and apparent potentialities for resulting in death.
If such an act is done in an un'lawful manner or
without due care and circumspection, the criminal
negligence is present. In other words, a dangerous act done in an unlawful manner or even with
lack of the care which such an act calls for is
done with criminal negligence. It does not require
reckless handling or conduct evincing marked disregard for the safety of others. The ingredient
of intrinsic dangerousness, plus the un'lawful
manner or the lack of due care and circumspection
demanded by the nature of the act, even be that
slight, constitutes criminal negligence. It is quite
true that certain infractions of the traffic laws
where the violation is done in a reckless manner
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'or with marked disregard for the safety of others
may also rise to the level of acts fraught with
danger to human life, and perhaps be chargeable
either under arm (a) or {b) of the statute.
"Strictly speaking, under (b) the doing of
the dangerous act is not itself unlawful. There
must a:lways be the ingredient of doing it in an
unlawful or careless manner, whilst under (a)
some acts amounting to a violation of the traffic
laws may be, by their very nature, dangerous
to life. They are, therefore, unlawful and dangerous to human life, but since the test is reckless
action or action marked by disregard of safety of
others, the element that it might produce death
if such element be present may be, in charging
under the (a) arm, ignored. An illustration will
make it dear. If the sp-eed limit is thirty miles
per hour and a driver goes thirty-five ·miles per
hour, he is violating the law, but the jury must
also find that his action in so going was ·reckless
in order to convict him under the theory of the
(a) arm. It may also be the case that such speed
was one which under the circumstances might produce death, but that is looked at as incident to,
or a consequence which may result from, the
recklessness. Since the act itself was unlawful,
the jury does not need to find that element. If,
however, the speed limit is sixty miles per hour
and the driver is going fifty-five miles an hour,
he is not by that alone doing an un'lawful act.
But if the jury finds that such speed might produ~e death (which it well might), then he is
guilty of manslaughter, if in addition he did not
carefully watch the road and for that reason an
accident occurred. Such would come under arm
(b). But wherever the act he was doing was
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, itself unlawful and reckl~ss, the charge may be
under arm (a)~ without the jury's determining
whether the recklessness was such as might produce ·death, for surely if a lawful act which might
produce death if done without due care, is man~laughter, the doing of an un1awful act which
might produce death is manslaughter. In arm
(a) the element of its potentiality for producing
death is not material. Its unlawfulness plus recklessness only is material.
''In another aspect some acts which are
chargeable under (a) according to the above
tests may be chargeable under (h) or, stated in
another way, acts which are chargeable under (b)
.by a certain construction of the statute may be
chargeable under (a). Arm (b) speaks of the
'doing of a lawful act,. which might prodluce
death, in an unlawful ma11Jfl)er'. This excludes at
once all acts which are toif'ally prohibited, S1-t-ch as
driving without a license, drivilng while wnder the
influence of int·oxioating liquor, d,riving ·a car with
bad brakes or with lights below test sboodards,
etc. None of these can, rega;rdless of how ca.reful
the driving, come ~tnder (b). And if such act totally prohibited is &one recklessly or w~t!h marked
disregard for the S·afety of others, it will be doVfl!e
with criminal negligence ood if death results will
sustain a charge of manslaughter unde.r arm (a).''
(STATE OF UTAH V. LINGMAN, 97 Utah 197
to 201.)
The writer cannot find the slightest implication in
the decision of the Lingman case which would justify
a trial court in holding that the unlawful act or acts
upon which an involuntary manslaughter charge is based
need not have a causal connection with the death of thL
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deceased. It is a cardinal principle of law that the un.
lawful act, to be a basis of the crime of involuntary
manslaughter, must be the direct and proximate cause
of the death of the deceased. In the instant case, where'
is there any causal connection between the driving of
the Pe,terson truck by the defendant without a license
and the death of the deceased~ Certainly no one will
contend that the fallacious "but for" rule has any
application here. Therefore, it follows that death must
be the natural r·esult and the probable consequence of
the commission of the unlawful act upon which the
homicide is based. 'The following cases are illustrative
of this rule :
California. PEOPLE V. BLACK (1931) 11 Cal.
App. 90, 295. P. 87.
Delaware. STATE V. LONG (1919) 7 Boyce
397, 108 A. 36; STATE V. MciVOR (1920)
31 Del. 123, 111 A. 616.
Florida. THOMPSON V. STATE (1933) 108
Fla. 370, 146 So. 201.
Idaho. STATE V. GEE (1930) 48 Idaho 688,
284 P. 845.
Indiana. DUNNVILLE V. STATE (1919) 188
Ind. 373, 123 N.E. 689; BLACKBURN V.
STATE ( 1932) 203 Ind. 332, 180 N.E. 180.
Michigan. PEOPLE V. BARNES (1914) 182
Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400.
NorthCarolina. STATE V. SATTERFIELD
(1930) 198 N.C. 682, 153 S.E. 155.
Ohio. STATE V. SCHAEFFER (1917) 96 Ohio
St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, L.R.A. 1918B, 945, Ann.
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Cas. 1918E, 1137; JACKSON V. STA'TE
(1920) 101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E. 870.
Tennessee. KELLER V. STATE (1927) 155
Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, 59 A.L.R. 685; HILLER V. STATE (1932) 164 Tenn. 388, 50
s.,v. (2d) 225.
Texas. NOR~IAN V. STATE (1932) 121 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 433,52 S.W. (2d) 1051.
Virginia. GOODMAN V. COM. (1930) 153 Va.
943, 151 S.E. 168.
Canada. REX V. WILMOT (1930) 64 Ont. L.
Rep. 605, 52 Can. Crim. Cas. 336 (1930) 1
D.L.R. 778.

~!.
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Thus, in THOJ\tlPSON v. STATE (1933) 108 Fla.,
370, 146 So. 201, it was said:
''The ru1e of liability as to criminal and civil
negligence is not the same. But in either case,
where violation of a statute or ordinance is relied on to prove that there was negligence in the
infliction of injuries or death, the causal con-.
nection between the violation of the statute or
ordinance and the injury or death inflicted must
be established. And in criminal cases it must he
established beyond a reasonable doubt. In this
case it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt
that the mere violation of the state statute prohibiting the parking of motor vehicles on the
highway (see chapter 10, 186 Acts 1925) caused
the death of the driver of one of the colliding
vehicles.''
In DUNNVILLE V. STATE (1919) 188 Ind. 373,
123 N.E. 689, it was held that whether the unlawful act
is committed in such wilfu'l disregard of the rights of
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others as to show a wanton recklessness as to the life
and limb of another person, or in violation of a positive
statute under circpmstances that show reckless dis:reg~rd
for the life and limb of another, it is always necessary,
to support a ·conviction of manslaughter, that the unlawful act be the proximate cause of the death.
In BLACKBURN V. STATE (1932) 203 Ind. 332,
180 N.E. 180, it was said:
'' It has been he~d by this court that, to constitute the crime of manslaughter, there mu,st be
such legal relation between the commission of
the unlawful act and the homicide that it logically
follows that the homicide occurred as a concomitant part of the perpetration of, or in furtherance
of an attempt to commit, the unlawful act. Therefore it follows that death must be the natural
result and the probable consequence of the comrnission of the unlawful act upon which the homicide is based.''
In PEOPLE V. BARNES (1914) 182 Mich. 179,
148 N.W. 400, a conviction of manslaughter for the killing of a pedestrian as the result of a cotlision, while
operating an automobile on a public highway at an
excessive rate of speed in violaJtion of the statute relating to the operation of motor v·ehicles, was reversed on
the ground that it did not appear that the homicide
was the direct and natural result of the unlawful act.
Where the evidence in a prosecution for involuntary
manslaughter based solely on the violation of a statute,
fails to show a proximate causal re'lation between the
breach of the statute and the death, which is essential
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to such a prosecution, a conviction cannot be sustained.
(STATE V. SATTERFIELD (1930) 198 N.C. 682, 153
S.E. 155.)
The following case and the dicta in the decision
is squarely in point with defendant's position that the
failure to comply with the license law is immaterial until
it can be shown that such failure was the proximate
cause of the death of the deceased.
In JACKSON V. STATE (1920) 101 Ohio St. 152,
127 N.E. 870, wherein it appeared that the killing was
occasioned by the violation of a statute forbidding an
excessive rate of speed in the operation of a motor
vehicle, the court, in holding that the disobedience of
the statute must have been the proximate cause of the
death, said:
''The square question is 'liaised here .as to
whether an accidental, urnint.entiowal killing of a
person by another engaged in an unlawful ,act
makes that person guilty of manslxuughter under
the statute, irrespective of any connection between the unlawful,act ·(Jffl,d the unintentional killing, and it seems to this oourt that an analysis
of the illogical a.nd absurd 'iiesults which would
necessarily follow the reoognition of such a rule
will a.nswe.r the query. For instance, if it be the
law, as charged by the tria~ court in this case,
that, if the jury find the accused unintentionally
struck and killed the decedent, while engaged in
an unlawful act, to wit, operating his car at a
greater rate of speed than 15 miles per hour:
they must find him guilty of manslaughter without reference to causation, then it must follow
that if the accused had been violating any other
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valid statute, however unconnected with the death
at the time of the unintentional kil'ling, he would
be guilty of manslaughter. For instance it is a
violation of a valid statute to operate a mot'O·r
vehicle without having first registered s~ame with
the secretary of state, . . . yet, . . . should the
driver of an automobile, while driving his car
without first having .registered it with the secretary 1of st.ate, ... be so wnfortu(fi)(Lte as t.o wnin...
tentionally run over and loill a person who inadvertently or pur>posely projected himself in frowt
of the car, he would be guilty of manslaughter;
for clearly it would be an wnintentional killing
by a pe.rson operating a car in violation of a
valid statute. And yet there would be no relar
tionship between the v iolation of the statut.e and
the de,ath. The accident would have occurred just
as surely had the motor vehicle been registered.
. . . The proximate caJUse would have been the
same in each case although the result to the driver
of the car would have been the appalling diffetrence between criminal guilt and leg.al itwJwcence."
1

The unlawful driving relied on as the basis for
a manslaughter action must have been the proximate
cause of death, and if death occurred from any cause
other than the unlawful act, there is no criminal liability. STATE V. SCHAEFFER (1917) 96 Ohio St.
21'5, 117 N. E. 220, L.R.A. 1918B, 945, Ann. Cas. 1918E,
1137, wherein the court said that, ''THE SAFER AND
SOUNDER DOCTRINE SEEMS TO BE RECOGNIZED IN MOST OF THE STATES, THA'T THE
UNLAWFUL ACT MUST BE A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE KILLING."
The mere vio~ation of a statute will not sustain a
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conviction of Inanslaughter where it appears that the
killing was not the natural or probable result of the
unlawful act. (HILLER V. STATE (1932) 164 Tenn.
388, 50 s.w. (2d) 225.
·The writer can conceive of very few situations in
which the operation of an automobile without a driver's
license could be the proximate cause of the death of a
deceased in_ a case of involuntary manslaughter. For
instance, if a person who is nearly blind was refused
a license to drive motor vehicles because of impaired
vision and then in marked disregard for the safety of
others drove an automobi~e without a license and, in
consequence of his impaired vision, killed the deceased,
such unlawful act would be the basis of the crime of
involuntary manslaughter. Testimony that his license
had been refused 1because of impairment of vision would
be competent because of its causal connection with the
failure of the defendant to see the situation which resulted in the death of the deceased. But, in the instant
case, where is there any such analogy 1 The evidence
3howed that the defendant's license had been revoked on
an a.Neged violation of Title 57 for driving a motor
vehicle under the influence of liquor. Therefor·e, the
failure to have a license to drive the truck in question
could not possibly have any causal connection with the
death of the deceased and the admission of the testimony
of Elisha Warner that the defendant's license had been
revoked was erroneous and prejudicial. Such testimony
would materially prejudice a jury against the defendant.
It is rather peculiar tha;t the court ruled against
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the defendant when this i'llegal evidence was received,
then reversed his position when he instructed the jury
that the illegal act of driving the truck without a license,
to be a basis of the crime of involuntary manslaughter,
must have directly and proximately caused the death
of the deceased. See Instruction No. 10, R. 33.
To the same effect was instruction No. 8 in which
the· court stated that the driving of an automobile under
the influence ·of liquor could not be the basis of involuntary manslaughter unless it was shown that the death
of the deceased was directly and proximately caused
thereby. R. 31.
Instruction No. 10, as given by the court reads as
follows:
"You are insrtructed that it is unlawful for
any person to operate a motor vehicle upon any
public highway of this state while his license to
do so is revoked, and when such an unlawful
act is done recklessly or with marked disregard
for the safety of others, the person so driving
is guilty of criminal negligence, and where such
criminal negligence direct~y and proximately
causes a death, the person guilty of so operating
such motor vehicle and thus causing the death,
is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. That is
to say, if the evidence in this case convinces your
minds beyond reasonable doubt that at the time
and place charged in the information the defendant did operate his truck upon a public highway as charged, and that at such time his driver's
license had been revoked, and that he drove his
said truck recklessly or with marked disregard
for the safety of the deceased, AND THAT ALL
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ATELY CAUSED THE DEATH OF THE D~
CEASED, then the defendant is guilty of involuntary 1na.nslaughter and it is your duty to ~o
find .. ,
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A careful scrutiny of the testimony of Bert and
Lawrence Karen pertaining to the operation of the
truck which it is alleged was involved in 1this accident
clearly eliminates any possible finding 1by the court or
the jury that the defendant's alleged unlawful act of
driving his truck without a license was done recklessly,
and with marked disregard for the safety of others,
amounting to criminal negligence and that such criminal
negligence directly and proximately caused the death of
the deceased, James Curwood. There is not a scintilla
of evidence in the record to justify a finding of simple
negligence let alone criminal negligence. We respectfully
call your attention to the verbatim :testimony of Bert
Karen, who observed the movement of this truck as
it approached the place of the accident, the manner in
which it was traveUing, the manner in which the driver
turned to the left to avoid striking the Karen truck,
which was illegally parked in the road, and the operation of the truck after it passed the scene of the accident. Assuming that the truck in question struck the
deceased (and the ·evidence clearly preponderates to
the contrary) where is the evidence that shows that the
defendant did anything in the operation of the truck
which caused the injuries and subsequent death of the
deceased? The deceased was found at the extreme lefthand edge of the hard surfaced pavement with his head
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approximately 14 to 18 inches to the right of the lefthand edge of the pavement and his feet projecting over
onto the shoulder of the road. Did the deceased inadvertently or purposely proje~t himself in front of the
truck? No one knows. What position was he in when
he was struck by the truck? No one knows. Did he
stwnble in his drunken condition from the borrow pit
onto the shoulder of the road in the path of the oncoming truck? No one knows. Was he struck when he was
lying down? No one knows. The truck was being operated in a norma~ and safe manner at a normal and
medium rate of speed. The driv·er was alert to the
existence of the Karen truck in the course of his path
and turned out as any normal and prudent driver would
naturally do. Is it not logical to assume that the deceaS"ed probably stwnbled from the left-hand borrow
pit where he had gone to relieve hims·elf in his drunken
condition onto the road at the time of the a:cciden~
rather than conclude that the driver would turn his
truck from its normal course to avoid striking the Karen
truck and then recklessly and with marked disregard
for the safety of others, run over the deceased.
PROPOSITION II. THE COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE AS TO
WHETHER 'THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR AT THE
TIME OF THE ALLEGED CRIME.
This Proposition will cover defendant's Statements
of Error Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 31, 32 and 33.
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The great preponderance of the evidence clearly
establishes that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged
crime or within a reasonable time before or thereafter.
We have the testimony of three Vernal police officers
that, in their opinion, ·he was under the influence of
liquor, and, on the other side we have the testimony
of two Colorado State Highway Patrolmen, Mr. Joe
Tobler and C. P. Allison, who were called by the State
and who definitely stated that all they could say from
their observation of Mr. Peterson was ~that he had been
drinking. Neither of these men would testify that he
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The following disinterested witnesses, who were called by the
defendant, clearly eliminates any implication that defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
John D. Gibbs, who was riding in the water truek that
followed the Peterson truck and who was with the defendant in custody for 20 hours at the police station,
after 2¥2 hours of observation of Mr. Peterson he freely
testified that there was nothing to justify a finding that
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
WilHam H. Sahli, the Justice of the Peace at Artesia,
Colorado, observed the defendant on Saturday night and
up as late as 2:00 o'clock Sunday morning. He unequivocally said there was no evidence of intoxication
or that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. This testimony was corroborated by Mrs.
Adair Brimhall, who observed the conduct of Mr. Peterson at the Club 40 up until the time that Peterson left
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at

or around 2:00 o'clock in the morning. The above
defendant's witnes.ses were entirely disinterested. Then,
in addition to these, we have :the testimony of E. H.
Peterson, Mary Peterson and Maxine Peterson, the father, mother and· sister of the defendant, who were
with him fo·r approximately 20 hours immediately following his arrest. It may be said these are interested
witnesses. The Peterson family are one of the outstanding families in Uintah County. The father operates the
flour mill in that section of Utah and it is hard to believe
that a mother and father would testify under oath to
an untruth as to their son's condition. The significant
fact that the Colorado officers refused to corroborate
the glib opinions of the police officers of Vernal lends
~redence to the positive ass·erltions of the disinterested
witnesses and the family of the defendant.
Irrespective of what finding should be made on the
testimony on this issue, we call the court's attention to
the fact that there was no foundation laid by any testimony of the State which would justify the court in
admitting evidence as to whether or not the defendant
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. There
was no action on the part of the defendant in the operation of his truck (assuming that his truck was involved
in the accident) which would in anywise justify the
court in admitting testimony that the defendant was
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The arguments advanced on the preceding Proposition are apropos on this issue. We challenge anyone to point out a
single, solitary act on the part of the defendant in the
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operation of his truck which would lay the foundation
to admit evidence as to whether the defendant was
mtder the influence of liquor. The trial court seemed
to think that the failure to keep a proper lookout ahead
was sufficient to permit the liquor issue to come into
the case. A careful analysis of the testimony of the only
two witnesses to this accident eliminates any implication that the defendant failed to maintain a proper lookout at the time of the accident. The evidence clearly
shows to the contrary. Bert Karen testified that he
watched the truck come from the east as it travelled
toward his parked pickup truck; that it was travelling
at a normal rate of speed, which was not slow nor fast
but just medium, or about 35 miles per hour; that notwithstanding the Karen pickup truck was parked substantially out onto the hard surfaced area of the highway and in the path of the Peterson truck, Peterson
drove his truck to the left and around the pickup truck
in a manner which was prudent and careful in the
opinion of Bert Karen, an experienced automobile mechanic; that the Peterson truck continued on up the road
in a normal and proper manner. Where is there any
evidence which the court or jury could say that James
Curwood was in a position on the road so that a person,
in the exercis·e of reasonable diligence would have seen
him there in time to have avoided the accident~ The
deceased's own associates did not know how he got onto
the road. They never even saw him get out of the truck.
We don't know whether he projected himself in front
of the Peterson truck, or how or in what manner he

dalltn
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

68
came in contact with the Peterson truck. Did he stumble
out of the borrow pit after the beam of the headlights
of the Peterson truck had passed the spot where he was
and tthen came in contact with the Peterson truck? No
· one knows. It was incumbent upon the State to show
that the defendant not only failed to observe the defendant, or that in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have observed him. The failure of the State ~
assume this burden and the fact that an accident occurred wiJI. not justify the court in permitting the liquor
issue to be considered by the court or the jury in determining whether or not the defendant's acts and conduct
were reckless and in marked disregard to the rights of
the deceased. From the evidence in this case, how could
any court or jury make a finding that the death of the
deceased was proximately caused by the defendant being
under the influence of intoxicating liquor? Even assuming that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
the principle of proximate cause has. the same application to this alleged unlawful act as it does to the alleged
unlawful act of driving the truck without a license, 8.8
S"et forth in our argument in the previous Proposition.
The foHowing citations are pertinent:
One who drives his car correctly, and on the proper
s~de of the highway, even though he be tthen intoxicated,
cannot be convicted of homicide if death results wholly
from the carelessness or negligence of the driver of
another car which collides with that driven by the accused. NORMAN V. STATE (1932) 121 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 433,52 S.W. (2d) 1051.
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In GOODMAN Y. COM. ( 1930) 153 Va. 943, 151
S.E. 168, a conviction of involuntary manslaughter was
reversed where it was not shown that death was the
natural and probable result of any reckless or culpably
negligent act on the part of accused.
99 A.L.R. 772, 733, 774.
The driving of an automobHe on a public highway,
by a driver intoxicated or under the influence of liquor,
is a crime by statute, and, if such act proximately causes
the death of another, the driver is guilty of involuntary
manslaughter. BLASHFIELD, Vol. 8, p. 102. Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice.

PROPOSITION III. THE COURT ERRED IN
OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION iTO DISMESS THE INFORMATION AND DISCHARGE THE
DEFENDAN'T AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S
CASE (T. 476-480) AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.
1 (R. 22, T. 728) TO DIRECT THE JURY TO RETURN A VERDICT OF NOT GU1LTY.
This proposition covers Statements of Error Nos.
4 and 5.
~~:€
Appellant contends that no ·competent evidence was
offered and received upon which the court could permit
trl'i1
the case to go to the jury. We have copiously set forth
:::~:1~
the facts in the :Statement of Facts with the necessary
--;·
~-~
transcript and record pages. It is mainfestly impose ,}5
sible for a court or jury to make a finding of criminal
! byJ
Tel. [ negligence under the facts of this. case as disclosed by
the record. We again reiterate, it is incumbent upon
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th~ State to prove crimina'l negligence on the part· of

the defendant, and that such criminal negligence was
the proximate cause of the death of James Cnrwood
Where in the evidence can we find factual support that
the State has successfully assumed this burden 1 The
argument on the Statements of Error hereinabove set
forth are equally apropos to the propositjon here. Receiving of incompetent evidence on issues for which no
proper foundation had been laid created a situation
which not only befogged the court through his misinterpretation of the Lingman case, but misled the jury as
to the application of the law of the case. The court
should never have permitted the liquor and license issues
to have come into the case until a proper foundation had
been laid for the admission of this evidence. No such
foundation was ever 'laid and defendant's motion to
dismiss the information and discharge the defendan4
made at the close of the State's case, should have been
granted.
We submit that this court should reverse the verdict and remand the case to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the same.
PROPOSITION IV. THE COURT ERRED IN
FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO 'THE
ELEMENTS OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
AND THE LAW PERTAINING THERETO, BUT ON
THE CONTRARY ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRIN·
CIPLES.
This Proposition covers defendant's S:tatements of
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Err-or Nos. 5 to 29 inclusive, as hereinabove set forth.
:Many of these statements of error have been previously discussed in this brief. Instructions pertaining
to the liquor and license issues are excepted to for the
reason . that no competent evidence had been offered
and received upon which a jury could make a finding
on these issues.
We call the court's attention to the erroneous instructions in which the trial court uses the alternative
''or'' in place of the conjunctive ''and'' in defining
criminal negligence. Criminal negligence, as defined by
the ruling of your Honorable Court, clearly indicates
that an unlawful act must be done recklessly and in
marked disregard for the safety of others to constitute
criminal negligence which is the basis of involuntary
manslaughter. The trial court throughout his instructions uses the alternative ''or'' instead of the conjunctive ''and''. In other words the jury were instructed
to find the defendant guilty if the defendant drove his
truck recklessly or in marked disregard for the safety
of others. Reckless driving may or may not be criminal
negligence. Criminal negligence is defined by your Honorable Court in State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180 as reckless conduct evincing a marked disregard for the safety
of others. The defendant assigned as error the use of
the alternative ''or'' instead of the conjunctive ''and''
in Instruction No. 7 ( Statem,ent of Error No. 16, R. 31,
T. 729); Instruction No. 8 (Statements of Error No. 17,
18, 19, R. 31, T. 729); Instruction No. 10 (Statements
of Error Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, R. 33, T. 730).
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Defendant contends that Instruction No. 15 (State.
ments of Error Nos. 28 and 29, R. 36, ·T. 731) and par.
ticularly that portion of said instruction which reads:
''Such negligence, however, does not justify or excuse the
defendant from running into or against him Wlith h~
truck, if you find from the .evidence beyornd reasonable
doubt that the defendant did rwn ilnto or against him
with his truck," was ambiguous and misleading. The
quoted portion of said instruction is left without qualification and therefore would mislead the jury into believing that irrespective of the negligence of the deceased
in going upon the public highway in an intoxicated condition, that such negligence would not justify or excuse
the defendant from running into or against him with his
truck irrespective of whether or not defendant was
criminally negligent in so doing.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing it appears that the jury was
erroneously instructed on matters of law to the prejudice of the appellant; that the verdict is contrary to
the law and to the evidence; and that defendant's motion for new trial should have been granted. That there
was no competent evidence off·ered and received upon
which the court or jury could make a finding that the
death of the deceased was proximately caused by an
unlawfui act or acts of the defendant amounting to
criminal negligence. That :there was nothing that appel·
lant did or that he failed to do that can be said to have
been the cause of the death of the deceased. That ·the
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judgment appealed fron1 should be reversed and the
cause ren1anded for such further proceedings as to this
eonrt may seem proper.
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Respectfully submitted,
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